Improving homeland security: challenges and improvement Essay

The United States of America had its share of enemies since it was considered as the new military superpower. But with regards to intelligence work and the ability to thwart an attack by an external army nothing was as dramatic as the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. It was a painful lesson in intelligence failure and past presidents vowed it will never happen again. But when 9/11 shook the nation, with an attack closer to home, many are wondering who dropped the ball in terms of intelligence work. This paper will look at the major challenges faced by the US intelligence community and the subsequent changes and transformation initiated by government officials to bring upon a marked improvement when it comes to information gathering and preventing future attacks in the US homeland. Before going any further it is important to examine the historical background of US intelligence and how it was shaped by global events especially during World War II and the Cold War with the former Union Soviet Socialists Republic of Russia. The discussion will then come in sharp focus to the events surrounding the infamous September 11, 2001 attacks. Background At the turn of the century, the American government, buoyed by the economic progress from the Industrial Age began to rise as a superpower. It was considered by many in the global arena as a force to contend with. Yet it took an unprovoked attack from an Imperial Army of Japan to finally force into everyone’s consciousness that indeed America is both feared and respected. So, one Sunday morning, more than sixty years ago, Hawaii – part of the Union yet situated far away in the Pacific – was mercilessly bombed by Japanese planes. The former President Franklin D. Roosevelt was right in denouncing the surprise attack as a day of infamy. There was no doubt that it was a day of ill repute as America was rudely made aware of their fast rising status. And with it comes enemies who perceive America as a threat or a country guilty of exploiting others. Whatever the perception, the US government will have to defend itself from enemies both foreign and domestic. Intelligence Failure In the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, the U. S. intelligence community was severely criticized for failing to warn the nation of an impending attack from the Japanese aggressors. It was found out late that there was enough intelligence gathered to have alerted the army base there, but it was largely ignored. This is a classic example of intelligence failure and the consequence of which lingers on for a long time. The Pearl Harbor incident was the catalyst that transformed the US Intelligence community. From then on the intelligence gathering capability of the United States of America was forced to improve. And then again, complacency is the predictable effect of success. When America’s chief nemesis the USSR was toppled down, America finds itself in unfamiliar territory, a world where there is no one to challenge and serve as a counter-balance to America’s military superiority. When everything was quiet no one was able to anticipate that it was merely the calm before the storm so to speak. History eerily repeated itself, the infamy of Pearl Harbor was relived again and this time it was not a thousand miles away from the center of America but the enemy struck the economic nerve center of the nation. It was the same cowardly attack that stunned an unprepared government and its people. Predictably, just as it was in Pearl Harbor, there were also a great number of casualties. In spite of the previous changes and improvements, the US Intelligence community was again caught flat footed. Intelligent Work According to Michael Turner intelligence gathering can have a variety of definitions but for the professional it is encapsulated in the following statements: †¦intelligence is a particular kind of information that helps to inform, instruct, and educate the policy world. To consumers of intelligence – the policy makers – intelligence is that and more. To political leaders [†¦] a political liability, depending on whether intelligence information helps or hinders the fulfillment of political goals (2005, p. 3). Intelligence gathering is therefore a tool that helps create certainty in a very uncertain world. It follows therefore that intelligence gathering is not merely the action of collecting data but would also mean the interpretation of the same. This aspect of intelligence gathering requires attention and the neglect of which is the root of many intelligence failures. It is simply not enough to have data but there must also be an equally effective means of interpreting the said information. Adapting to Change For thousands of years the nature of warfare remained constant. Thus, two opposing camps fight it out in the battlefield. There was the effective use of troop movement and the use of military hardware. The commander who can utilize men and resources effectively wins the battle and ultimately the war. But since 9/11 the world has been rudely awakened to a different type of warfare. It is guerilla tactics brought into urban centers and far away from the traditional fields of war. If this is the new face of war then intelligence gathering must also be transformed to adapt to it. Intelligence gathering must now be geared towards an enemy led not by a traditional army but extremists who will fight for a cause that sometimes transcend national boundaries. Rendered Ineffective Aside from the guerilla tactics used by the members of the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups another reason for the failure of the US response were the laws that prevented for a more thorough investigation of suspicious characters. The strength of America which is the significant number of civil liberties enjoyed by its citizens became the liability that was exploited by the terrorists. In fact the 9/11 Commission pointed out that there were laws that were enacted to curtail some of the investigative powers of the FBI. According to the 9/11 Commission, â€Å"The FBI was criticized, rightly, for the overzealous domestic intelligence investigations disclosed during the 1970s. The pendulum swung away from those types of investigations during the 1980s and 1990s† (see 9/11 Commission Report). The FBI was then forced to take on kids gloves when treating suspected terrorists. Al-Qaeda on the other hand perceived these new developments as weaknesses they can exploit. Aside from ineffective laws the US Intelligence community has to deal with a host of other problems that includes 1) the improper analysis of information and intelligence; 2) the lack of coordination between government agencies; and 3) the absence of system where law enforcement agencies as well as counter-terror groups can share information. Human Intelligence But the most significant intelligence source with regards to the topic is â€Å"HUMINT† or human intelligence. And the reason is easy to understand – there are a lot of problematic factors related to this type of intelligence. First of all most information gathered through this method can be considered as secondary. There must be a way of processing raw data in order to determine its accuracy. In this regard there is now a move to develop technical and human resources that will be able to fully analyze â€Å"humint† as expounded in the following statements: The very nature of the transnational threat demands that we have analysts with language capabilities and are knowledge to understand local situations in relationship to global, transnational, and international trends and impacts. Analysts need a professional network that transcends territorial borders, and they need to be comfortable turning to local as well as global information (Sands, 2005, p. 75).